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NOTES AND COMMENTS
iTorts: Facts Evidencing Contributory Negligence
In the case of Bennett v. Hall,' an action was brought for
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by
the plaintiff through the negligent operation of defendant's auto-
mobile, resulting in a collision with the automobile which the
plaintiff was driving.
There was no substantial conflict in the evidence which indi-
cated that the accident resulted when the plaintiff, driving at a
speed within the authorized limit, struck the defendant's car which
had pulled on to the principal highway from a side road and into
the path of the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff had seen the
defendant's automobile approaching the highway when he (the
plaintiff) was about 500 feet away from the intersection. The
plaintiff watched the defendant approach the intersection, and
when 300 feet away began to slow his automobile. When he real-
ized that the defendant was not going to stop, he "applied his
brakes as quickly as he could," but was unable to avoid the
collision.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, conceded that
the plaintiff was travelling on a preferred thoroughfare, at a speed
under the allowable limit, in his proper lane, had the right-of-way,
and that the defendant was negligent, but affirmed the action of
the District Court of Alamosa County in entering a judgment of
dismissal.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, stated that
the general rule was that the driver of a motor vehicle must at
all times so operate it as to maintain reasonable control over it,
the degree of control being dependent upon conditions and cir-
cumstances.
The court cited Crocker v. Johnston,2 in holding, "The right of
way of one proceeding in the favored direction is not absolute,
but he must exercise all reasonable care and keep his car under
control."
The opinion then decided that the plaintiff's failure to guard
against "the probability of the eventuality" furnished ample ground
for a conclusion that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Finally, the court concluded that under the circumstances there
was no reasonable basis upon which fair minded men, without
prejudice, could reach different conclusions, and that, as a matter
of law, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
It would appear, to the contrary, that under the facts as above
enunciated, the issue of contributory negligence should have been
submitted to the jury.
In Ankeny v. Talbot,3 the court recognized the fundamental
rule that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway has the
' Colo. .. 290 P. 2d 241, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Qh., Vol. 8, No. 2, P. 56, (1955).
243 N.M. 469, 95 P. 2d 214 (1939).
3 126 Colo. 313, 215 P. 2d 1019 (1952).
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right to rely upon observance of the law by other persons driving
motor vehicles thereon. The U.S. Court of Appeals, in Thomasson
v. Burlington Transportation Co.,' adopted the same rule.
'53 C.R.S. 13-4-55 reads: "The driver of a vehicle about to
enter ... a highway from a private road . . . shall yield the right-
of-way to all vehicles approaching on said highway."
An interesting, and applicable, analogy can be drawn from the
case of Rosenbaum v. Riggs5 in which the court held that where
one party had the right-of-way, the other party was under a duty
to recognize that the one having the right-of-way might not slacken
speed.
It seems clear then, that the plaintiff had a right to assume
that the defendant would not take the right-of-way from him in
entering the highway in clear violation of the statutory duty.
The court in the instant case recognized the fundamental rule
to be that the determination of whether the plaintiff failed to
use due and proper care ordinarily should be submitted to the
jury. However, it took the view that under the facts reasonable
men could not differ as to the ultimate determination.
It is felt that the court should have perhaps emphasized the
fundamental rule, heeding its words in Arps v. Denver,":
"It is only in the clearest of cases, when the facts are un-
disputed, and it is plain that all intelligent men can draw
but one inference from them, that the question is ever one
of law for the court."
On the above bases, the conclusion is inescapable that the
court in the instant case failed to give due consideration to the
effect of the duty of the defendant to stop at the intersection, and
the resulting right in the plaintiff to assume that the defendant
would comply with the law. Such a "right to assume a compliance
with the statute" should necessarily be an element to be consid-
ered in determining whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances.
It is submitted that the "right to assume compliance," along
with the facts conceded by the court to be present, should be
sufficient to permit the view that "the minds of reasonable men
might properly reach different conclusions." Any other view, it
is felt, would impose upon the driver of a vehicle on the highway
the duty of guarding against, not the probability, but the "possi-
bility of the eventuality." Such a rule would hardly be consistent
with any rule of law previously applied by the Court in this state.
JOHN J. CONWAY
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4 128 F. 2d 355, Tenth Circuit (1942).
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